Chapter 12

A Pirate’s View of the History of Art Commerce: Beyond an Oceanic View of Civilizations

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1. Redefining Piracy

1.1 The Battamon Disturbance

Let’s begin with the battamon disturbance. In 2010, Okamoto Mitsuhiro’s “Battamon” series was exhibited at the Kobe Fashion Museum (fig.1). While the etymology of the term is uncertain, in Japan’s western Kansai region it refers to a product that is sold without going through authorized distribution routes. Batchimon, on the other hand, refers to a counterfeit or imitation item. In Japanese, batta also refers to grasshoppers (including locusts). With this in mind, Okamoto created migratory locusts clothed in leather from brand products. However, Louis Vuitton complained that this exhibit was equivalent to engaging in counterfeit sales, and it was halted. Tano Taiga engraved original bags out of wood with exactly the same pattern as those of Louis Vuitton, and it is said that a public museum had to hide their logo marks when they were put on display.2 The obstinacy of brand distributors not trying to understand jokes might invite contemptuous laughs. In this paper, I will consider the currents of world history lying behind such incidents,3 and refer to this approach as a “pirate's view of world history.”

Today, when one hears of piracy, what comes to mind? Perhaps the bands that attack ships passing through the Strait of Malacca, or the professional groups off the coast of Somalia that attack commercial ships, take hostages, and demand sizeable ransoms. These pirates are like private soldiers that exist outside of state-approved armies. What about the Strait of Hormuz? If it is closed off by Iran’s army, then the crude oil supply from Persian Gulf oil-producing

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1 This paper is part of the book I am currently working on, tentatively entitled Bunka bon’yaku no chikaku hendō, bunka-kan katto no kibōgaku jōetsu 文化翻訳の地殻変動、文化間葛藤の気象学 序説. English Title: Beyond an Oceanic View of Civilizations, Towards a Tectonics in Trans-cultural Transactions (TTT) & Climatology of Cultural Conflicts (CCC).


3 Yamada Shōji 山田奨治, Nihon no chosakuten wa naze komma ni kibishii no ka 日本の著作權はなぜこんなに厳しいのか (Why is Japan’s Copyright so Strict?) (Kyoto: Jimbun Shoin, 2011). At the end of this work, the text of Japan’s copyright law is reproduced. However, in order to “correctly” understand it, the explanation of an attorney with considerable experience working in related court cases is necessary. Inaga Shigemi 稲賀繁美, “Bunka isan to shite no CM no hozon to kōka kō kangaeru” 文化遺産としてのCMの保存と公開を考える (Considering the Preservation and Public Release of Commercials as Cultural Assets) (Shikō no gūkei 思考の隅景 [The Corner Shadows of Thought] Series, no. 89), Tosho shinbun 図書新聞 (The Book Review Press) 2773 (6 May 2006).
countries will be blocked. In order to prevent this, the United States’ navy and others engaged in military action. What distinguishes piracy from state-backed military action? Furthermore, what is the basis of the judgment of the “international community” that deems Somali piracy and Iran’s activities as criminal acts, and for what reasons is this seen as “right”? 4

1.2 Minor and Major Pirates

Here, let us abruptly turn to the painter Paul Gauguin (1848–1903). Was this untamed painter who moved to the Southern Pacific island of Tahiti a pirate? His former friend Camille Pissarro spoke negatively of him, stating that Gauguin until recently had been pilfering from Persians and Japanese, and is now engaging in piracy in the Southern Pacific.5 Gauguin’s Tahiti depictions actually appropriated a motif from a mural at the Saqqara burial ground in Egypt and borrowed from Hokusai sketches. He also based his image of a woman standing on a southern small island on a Buddhist image from Borobudur. While 1980s feminism censured him,6 Gauguin, in reality, was just a “small-time robber” who escaped to Tahitian society, at the fringes of the colonial rule based on Western imperialism’s conquest of the world. He was not a great evil, that is, the Western domination itself that constructed such world hegemony.7

Let us go back in history. In 1494, two years after Christopher Columbus “discovered” the American continent, the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed (fig. 2). It was an absurd act of piracy which tried to divide the entire earth equally between Spain and Portugal based on the principle that lands to the west would belong to the former and the east to the latter. This was a time at which the difference between the New World and India was unclear, and thus of course the existence of the Pacific as well. Due to confusion regarding the latitude line lane that marked their domains, Brazil would end up as part of the Portuguese-speaking world, as it continues to be today. In fact, arguments and feuds would frequently erupt around this dividing line: on one side, in the Caribbean Sea (1508) and the eastern coast of Brazil (1521), and on the other side in Malacca Strait (1505), Batavia (1519), and the Maluku Islands and Manila (1571). Judging from it one may say that, the modern world order was created by piracy. Portugal occupied Goa (on India’s western coast) in 1511. Even Vasco Da Gama’s ocean voyage did not open a boat route in a virgin land’s ocean that had no commerce: for centuries Arab merchants’ dhows had

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4 “Kaizoku wa kyōtsū no teki” 海賊は共通の敵 (hostis humani generis: “Beichū haken no jidai”) (米中覇権の時代 [An Era of US-China Battles Over Hegemony] Series, no. 2), Mainichi shinbun 毎日新聞 (20 March 2012). Here Proudhon’s What is Property? (1840) comes to mind. Property (propriété) also refers to possessions. In the same year Proudhon wrote The Philosophy of Poverty (1846), which Marx would purposely misread as The Poverty of Philosophy. The issue will be further analyzed in sections 2-2 to 2-4. See also Takeda Isami 竹田いさみ, Sekai o ugokasu kaizoku 世界を動かす海賊 (Pirates who Change the Whole World) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2013).


crossed the Arabian Sea. The Portuguese were the pirate intruders. Do the descendants of these people really have the right to criticize Somali piracy as unethical?

Of course, Southern Europe began ocean-based exploration in search of India and Southeast Asia’s resources and riches. The reality of the Mediterranean Ocean being ruled over by the Islamic world stood in the way. Granada fell in 1492, the same year as the “discovery of the New World.” Yet, the expression “Reconquista,” which refers to Christians recovering lost territory on the Iberian Peninsula, is rather dubious insofar as Christians had not ruled over it in the past. Christian countries would take control of the Mediterranean Sea ninety years later, after they had emerged victorious over the Ottoman Empire in 1571.

1.3 Ambitions for World Domination
During this era, Philippe II (1527–98), taking advantage of the unity of Spain and Portugal, reigned over the “empire on which the sun never sets.” Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–98) lived at the same time (fig. 3). Spain had advanced to Taiwan, and built Fort Zeelandia in Tainan and Fort San Domingo in Tamsui (located in the northernmost part of Taiwan). Hideyoshi, who had went on expeditions to Korea from 1592 to 1593 and 1597 to 1598, had originally aspired to conquer the “Great Ming Empire,” and was hoping to go to Taiwan next. These conquerors of East and West who had ambitions for a worldwide empire could have led to a confrontation in Taiwan in the international situation of the day. In the background to this desire for conquest of Japan’s military unifier was the reality of the Ming having its plate full with defending itself from northern threats.

Immediately after Hideyoshi, the Date Domain’s Hasekura Tsunenaga (1571–1622) would cross the Pacific Ocean, pass through Mexico from Acapulco to Veracruz, and then, after crossing the Atlantic, have an audience with the Pope in Rome. Since during his voyage the Edo shogunate had adopted a so-called isolationist policy, him and his party were left stranded in Manila until they received permission to return to Japan in 1620, seven years after they had departed the country. Here as well we should not make the mistake of thinking that Tsunenaga went on an ocean voyage that no man had gone on before. Portugal had already occupied Macao in 1557, and Spain, which was Portugal’s rival, then took over Manila in 1571. Soon thereafter the galleon route to Acapulco would be opened, thus shaping Tsunenaga’s itinerary. At the time the advancement of Japanese towns in Southeast Asia was pronounced. As if to intersect with this, the Netherlands would first in 1613 open a trading post in Hirado, and in 1618 build a fort in Batavia, Java. In 1623, on Amboyna (part of the Maluku Islands), a gruesome incident occurred in which the Dutch massacred Englishmen, partially due to mutual misunderstandings of the parties dispatched to the East-Indies. Around twenty Japanese people

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become mixed up in it and lost their lives. It is an episode that narrates for us the scale of trade and human movement at the time.

1.4 The “Pre-Modern” Asian Seas

In the preceding century, in the Ming under the Yongle Emperor Zheng He 鄭和 (1371–1434) went on seven expeditions (1405–1433). In Japanese these are currently referred to as the “Great Expedition” (daiensei 大遠征; in China the endeavor is called “Great Voyage”). On his final voyage, Zheng, a Semu (色目) eunuch, is said to have made a pilgrimage to Mecca. His massive undertakings are thought to each have mobilized 26,000 people. They used existing commercial boat routes of Chinese merchants up through the Strait of Malacca and relied on the piloting of Indians and Arabs from the Indian Ocean onwards.10 Sometimes referred to as the silk road of the ocean, this route was a main artery of the trade of goods between the East and West, which can be seen by, for example, the Fustat Ruins in the suburbs of Cairo. Fustat is famous for the massive amount of ceramic pieces that were unearthed there. Almost fifteen percent of these fragments, which span from the eight to seventeenth century, are Chinese ceramics. Furthermore, it is thought that many of the unearthed fragments were created in imitation of Chinese products.11

Insofar as we believe The Travels of Marco Polo, a century before Zheng He during the Yuan dynasty, Marco Polo (1254–1324) used an ocean route from Quanzhou when returning from the Yuan. While it was a voyage that ended up requiring two years due to him waiting for trade winds, the Venetian merchant could use it because it had been an excellent established trade route. Baghdad, where Marco Polo stopped by on his way home, in the past had boasted a population of one million people. However, it had fallen in 1259 at the hands of Hulagu. Kublai is well known in Japan for attempting to invade the country twice, once in 1274 and again in 1281. He also attacked Java’s Singhasari Kingdom in 1292. After the Mongolian invasions, people near the shores of China and the Korean peninsula would frequently be harmed by the pirates called wakō 倭寇 (Ch. wokou; Kr. waegu). It is thought that amongst them were many people from Fujian and other places who had been mobilized for the Mongolian invasions.12

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11 For a classic work written for a general audience, see Mikami Tsugio 三上次男, Tōji no michi 陶磁の道 (The Way of Ceramics) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969).

12 See section 1 “Wakō to Higashi Ajia tsūkōken” 倭寇と東アジア通交圏 (Japanese Pirates and the Zone of Friendly Relations Between Countries in East Asia) in Higashi Ajia tsūkōken to kokusai ninshiki 東アジア通交圏と国際認識 (The Zone of Friendly Relations Between Countries in East Asia and International Perception), ed. Tanaka Takeo 田中健夫 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997). The political conflicts between Japan and Korea and debates surrounding views of Japan's wars of invasion have been projected onto academic disputes regarding the ethnic makeup of wakō, which can be divided into an early period and later period. Since scholars cannot do away with their political positions, it has become very difficult for them to come up with objective academic interpretations with regard to this issue. See, for example, Hatano Yūsuke 橋野裕介, “Wakō to kaiyōshi kan” 倭寇と海洋史観 (Wakō and Views of Ocean History), Risōmeikan Daigaku Jinbun
Oliver Wolters, an authority in research on the ocean of Southeast Asia, has argued that the rise and fall of powers in this ocean area around Southeast Asia’s islands can be likened to a mandala. Each regional power’s sphere of influence would repeatedly expand and shrink in accordance with the rise and fall of its authority. These multiple spheres of influence would exist alongside each other, sometimes serving as a magnetic field for conflict. Authority rarely took the form of lasting dominance that asserted naval supremacy.13

1.5 The Background to the Establishment of “International Law”
Having provided a quick overview of Asian oceans before Western powers invaded, let us once again return our viewpoint to the Western world. Before the Battle of Lepanto, Christian countries located on the borders of Europe were actually taking great pains to benefit from the Ottoman Empire. François I (1494–1547) lived during the same time as Süleyman (1494–1566) (fig. 4). The former would acquire from the latter exclusive capitulation rights as a blessing on the grounds that he was a Person of the Book. However, when European powers gained strength, this would become a pretext for encroaching on Turkish territory.14 This trick would be repeated: by cleverly using such privileges as diplomatic ones (like consular jurisdiction), European powers would throughout the Far East establish settlements, and, with them as their base, unexpectedly acquire colonies.15 These were acts of piracy that pretended to be legal.16

Here, the establishment of the legal thought known as “international law” becomes an

Kagaku Kenkyūsho kiyō 立命館大学人文科学研究科紀要 (Bulletin of Ritsumeikan University's Institute of Humanities) 81 (2003).


14 Matsui Masako 松井真子, “Osuman Teikoku no ‘jōyaku no sho’ ni miru saikei koku jōkō” オスマン帝国の「条約の書」にみる最恵国条項 (Most Favored Country Clauses in Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire), in Osuman teikokushi no shosō オスマン帝国史の諸相 (Various Aspects of Ottoman Empire History), ed. Suzuki Tadashi 鈴木董 (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 2012), 128–149. As of 9 April 2012, the Wikipedia English language article “Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire,” has very little information on the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Western European countries. Furthermore, there is no Japanese article on the subject.

15 A famous incident involving misunderstandings by the Western world regarding China’s tribute system is the King George III’s British envoy George Macartney’s audience with the Qing’s Qianlong Emperor 乾隆帝 in Rehe 熱河 (1792). While after the Ming dynasty, a tentative schema regarding tributary relationships in the Qing can be found in Hamashita Takeshi 浜下武志, “Chūgoku no gin kyūshū ryoku to chōkō bōeki kankei” 中国の銀吸収力と朝貢貿易関係 (China’s Power to Suck in Silver and Tributary Trade Relationships), in Ajia kōekiken to Nihon kōgyōka アジア交易圏と日本工業化 1500–1900 (The Asian Trade Sphere and Japan’s Industrialization: 1500 to 1900), ed. Hamahista Takeshi and Kawakatsu Heita 川勝平太 (Tokyo: Libro Pōto, 1991). For a survey from a European-American perspective, see Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in The Age of Commerce 1450–1680 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, 1993).

16 While as part of Tōyō Bunko’s series “Jikū o koeru hon no tabi 2” 時空をこえる本の旅2 (A Book Trip Transcending Time and Space) we find the small booklet Higashi Indo gaisha to Ajia no kaizoku 東インド会社とアジアの海賊 (The East India Company and Asian Pirates) (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko Museum, 2012), it should have been titled Higashi Indo gaisha wa Ajia no kaizoku (The East India Company Were Asia’s Pirates).
issue. Grotius (1583–1645) is known as the father of international law. His 1625 *On the Law of War and Peace* was a legal theory surely crafted with very realist concerns in mind amidst the struggle with England over ocean supremacy. The young Grotius’ *The Free Sea* (1609) was presented as a counter-argument to England’s ocean supremacy. Even some years later it was forced to fight opposing discourses such as that found in John Selden’s *Closed Sea* (1635). Behind *On the Law of War and Peace* was the waiting-to-erupt issue of the Netherlands’ capturing of Portuguese boats in the Singapore Strait, regarding which Grotius engaged in a debate with Scotland's William Welwood. His legal theory would, after his death, form the theoretical foundation of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, and be seen as contributing to the end of the tragedy that was the Thirty Years’ War. While the independence of the Netherlands was recognized *de facto* with this treaty, in *On the Law of War and Peace* Grotius defined the high seas, and incorporated the right to wage war in them into state power.

What reality was lying in the background to Grotius’ work? Put straightforwardly, it was rampant privateering, which was equivalent to lawlessness. England undermined Spain and Portugal’s dominance, and the raging privateering (such as that of Captain Drake) being carried out with the official recognition of Queen Elizabeth contributed to this. It is true that, having defined piracy as an illegal act, Grotius’s theory offered a very effective legal framework. And yet, if this is the case, a clear fact also becomes apparent: in the Western World before the establishment of international law, there was basically no permanent legal framework for restricting piracy.

In the aftermath of the Amboyna massacre, England washed its hands of the waters around the Maluku Islands, and focused on its colonization and management of India for nearly two centuries. England would not again extend its tentacles to the east until Raffles’ occupation of Singapore (1819). A record remains with us of a speech Raffles (1781–1826) gave to the sultans of the Malacca coast. He famously stated that just like piracy is not an embarrassing undertaking for them, trade is not an embarrassing act for the English. Therefore, the English public servant asked that the local “Malays” cooperate with English-led trade. It is surely already clear to the reader what happened here: based on the international law framework nurtured by Grotius,
piracy in the Malacca Strait was branded illegal, and ocean supremacy for trade was defined as just and legal. Is it too ironic to say that Raffles hypocritical sense of justice was supported by nothing other than the “international law” that had been supposedly inaugurated since the Peace of Westphalia?

2. Various Methods of Writing World History

2.1 Venice and Sakai

Here, let us quickly review the ocean-based historical view of civilizations advocated by Kawakatsu Heita. While relying on Umesao Tadao’s ecology-based historical view of civilization, he points out that it lacks a perspective on ocean-based commerce. Umesao’s theory was centered on the desert region that separated the center of the Eurasian continent into East and West, and divided Eastern and Western civilization into four spheres. He hypothesized that in Japan and Western Europe, which are located at the edges of the East and West, parallel phenomena can be found in their civilizations’ ecological transitions. When one reflects on Umesao’s theory a half century later, its split seams become apparent. He crafted it in the 1960s, when Japan was experiencing amazing economic growth, and also at the historical point in which in the Old World so-called modernization had only happened in Western Europe and Japan.

We could certainly criticize him for making questionable intellectual leaps and bounds to explain this phenomenon while using the trappings of ecology. Kawakatsu commendably points out that Umesao’s ecological suppositions completely ignore the physical distribution of goods by humans, and tries to supplement Umesao’s schema by adding such routes. Both Umesao and Kawakatsu to an extent were trying to argue against the Marxist developmental view of capitalist history during a time in which its validity as grand theory of world history was still believed in. In addition, let us mention here Hayami Akira’s academic theory of historical demography and economic history, known as “Industrious Revolution.” Hayami, using Japan as a model, engaged in wordplay to present a concept rivaling the “Industrial Revolution” of Western modernity that began in England. To empirically prove this idea, he statistically measured increase in agricultural production relative to population.

Traditionally the academic view of the “takeoff” of Western European modernity has held


22 A classic work from Japan arguing against the application of Marxist notions to conceptions of world history is Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定, Tōyōteki kinsei 東洋的近世 (Eastern Early Modernity) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1999 [Osaka: Kyōiku Taimusu sha, 1950]). From the perspective of industrial and trade history, see Kawakatsu Heita and Hamashita Takeshi, Umi to shibonsugi 海と資本主義 (The Ocean and Capitalism) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha, 2003).


that it was secured by the development of the complementary triangular trade: the export of slaves from Africa to South America, the export of sugar and cotton from South and North America to Europe, and the export of textiles, spirits, and weapons from Western Europe. However on the backside of this was the movement of a massive amount of silver from Peru to Europe and Japan to China. The excess of exports from Europe and China were in this way settled with enormous amounts of silver (fig. 5).25

2.2 Orthodoxy and Deviation

While a somewhat arbitrary choice, it is interesting to compare Venice and Sakai as port cities that played a symbolic role in this. At the end of the sixteenth century, the many voyagers who arrived in Japan from Southern Europe called Sakai the Venice of the East in light of its prosperity.26 While perhaps an assessment a bit too much favorable to Japan, it is certainly not impossible to read into the fortunes of these two cities a comparison between Europe, where capital-intensive finance had developed, and Japan, where the labor-intensive use of fortunes was carried out. In 1898, the Venice Biennale, an art festival that continues today, began. Then, in 1906 Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzō) (1863–1913) published The Book of Tea, which he had written in English in Boston. This work, which compares—without refraining from exaggeration—the material prosperity of the Western world with the spirituality of the East, ends with the anecdote of the suicide of Sen no Rikyū (1522–1591), the legendary tea master from Sakai.27 Here we find Okakura’s persistent will to trumpet to Western society an aesthetics that was the polar opposite of finance capitalism.

In 1986 Isamu Noguchi (1904–1988) participated in the Venice Biennale as a representative of the United States. The “Slide Mantra”—a large marble swirling slide—that he displayed received high acclaim as a sculpture. However, the “Akari” sculptures that he exhibited with confidence were sharply criticized for being nothing more than a lamp and having mistaken design for art. It was even rumored that this led to him not receiving the grand prize. These sculptures, drawing from Gifu paper lanterns, were hollow bamboo frames surrounded by Japanese paper. At this stage it was not seen as proper “art” in the West. A value judgment was at work here that held paintings and sculpture but not lanterns from Japan to be “art.”28 Japanese aesthetics were not considered appropriate for a European art biennale exhibition.

A similar value judgment has in very recent times repeatedly manifested itself. When El Anatsui, a sculptor residing in Africa who was similarly invited to the Venice Biennale in the first decade of the new millennium, was going to have solo public exhibitions in 2011 in Japan,

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25 For more historical details, which the present paper has to omit due to space limitations, see Iwata Shuzen 岩田秀全, Gin no Sekaiishi 銀の世界史 (The World History of Silver) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2016), esp. 64–67, 71–92. See also Takeda Isami, Sekaiishi o tsukutta kaizoku 世界史をつくった海賊 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2011).

26 This commerce and influx of wealth can be reconstructed with festivals still held today. Tsuruoka Mayumi 鶴岡真弓, ed., Kyoto ikoku isan 京都異国遺産 (Kyoto’s Foreign Country Heritage) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2007).


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a dispute occurred (fig. 6). Along with several art museums, Osaka’s National Museum of Ethnology was chosen as a venue. Specialists in the field from North America and West Africa voiced intense opposition to this.29 While in the past discrimination made the likes of placing African primitive art alongside Western European Renaissance Art out of the question, today this has changed, and it now has become an item of belief that African modern art is considered something that should only be displayed in art museums, definitely not ethnology ones.

On the other hand, it was decided that in 2008 a large-scale exhibition of Japanese mingei 民藝 (translated as both “folk crafts” and “folk art”) was to be held in Paris. However, its venue was to be not the Louvre Museum, a sanctuary of classical art, or the Pompidou Centre, a shrine of contemporary art, but the Quai Branly Museum, which primarily exhibits art from Africa and Oceania.30 When this was announced, it was rumored that at first there were voices of discontent from the Nihon Mingeikyōkai 日本民藝協会. In the past Okakura Kakuzō advocated tea ceremony to counter Western art, but, somewhat ironically, this Japanese mingei organization that was founded by Yanagi Sōetsu—who worked to revitalize tea ceremony—now disapproves of being placed alongside African and Oceanic art. From a circle that overlapped with that of the mingei movement was published a book entitled Nanpō kyōeiken no mingei 南方共栄圏の民藝 (Mingei of the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere) when Japan was advancing to the south during World War II. In other words, during this time the mingei movement stuck to a set of values that saw Southeast Asian popular art as brethren of the same rank as themselves.31 Then, from when exactly did mingei part ways with non-Western people’s folkways, and tried to rise in the world to hold exhibits at venues fit for Western art?

2.3 Hegelianism’s Transmigration

The set of values that sees Western traditions as the “orthodox” and locates the non-West on their margins is referred to as Western-centrism. While it would be too harsh to accuse a single person as having been the root of this evil, often times this has been done to the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). Him seeing the embodiment of the Weltgeist (world spirit) in Europe and his discussion of the Zeitgeist has exerted a worldwide influence in the latter half of the nineteenth century. However, Hegel’s Eurocentric view of history was not

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31 For the poet Tagore’s reminiscences regarding this same kind of attitude, see, R. Tagore, “On Oriental Culture and Japanese Mission,” address to the members of Indo-Japanese Association, Tokyo, 15 May 1929. The passage is quoted and commented on in Rustom Bharucha, Another Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 170.
something that only could be applied to Europe. *The Ideals of the East*, the English work which the aforementioned Okakura wrote in India, applied Hegel’s theoretical framework to read the self-development of Eastern art into the history of Japanese art.32 This attempt was inherited by Ernest Binfield Havell’s *The Ideals of Indian Art*, and, similarly, the Sri Lankan Ananda Coomaraswamy—who advocated a pan-Indianistic view of Indian art—also tried to see the embodiment of the Indian ideal in Indian art using the same logic.33 We could say that Hegelian aesthetics offered an unexpected theoretical backing to (ethnic) nationalism in modern Asia, contrary to Hegel’s own agenda.

Is the chronological framework that manages the flow of Western history really compatible with that of Eastern history?34 When considering this problem, we could carry out an East-West comparison of the word “revolution.” In his *Révolution, histoire d’un mot*, Alain Rey, an international authority in lexicography, avoids examining the Chinese word for revolution *geming* 革命 on the grounds that the philosophy behind revolution in the West differs from that of the *yixing* 易姓 revolution.35 It is certainly true that the way of thinking that sees dynasty change as boiling down to the will of Heaven is different in nature than the philosophy behind citizens’ political action that seeks to overthrow existing authority. With that said, if one uses the phrase “Chinese Cultural Revolution,” then “revolution” and *geming* would be treated as interchangeable based on the same terminological standard. Similarly, if the French Revolution is translated into Chinese using *geming*, it would be understood based on this Chinese concept. However, we should not flatly prohibit this. Chen Jiangong 陳建功, a former red guard who became the head of the Chinese Writer’s Association (Zhongguo wenbijia xiehui 中国文筆家協会), confesses that he was surprised to find out thirty years after the fact that China’s Cultural Revolution occurred at the same time as the Western world and Japan’s student uprisings.36

### 2.4 Anachronism and Transmigration

Accidental simultaneity also reminds us of the fictional nature of world histories based on a mechanical chronology. England’s John Onians has compiled the *Atlas of World Art* in order to escape traditional Hegelian Euro-centric historical narratives of world art (fig. 7).37 However,

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36 “60 nendai no seinen undō” 60年代の青年運動 (The Youth Movements of the 60s), *Ajia yūgaku アジア遊学* (Intriguing Asia) 42 (July 2002).

such an undertaking actually shows that the establishment of the framework of world art history was nothing more than a process that progressed hand in hand with the unfolding of Europe’s perception of the world.\textsuperscript{38} As early as 1987 China’s Huang Yong Ping 黄永砯 put on exhibition as an artwork a lump of pulp entitled \textit{The History of Chinese Painting and the History of Modern Western Art Washed in the Washing Machine for Two Minutes}. We could say that in order to unify Western art and Chinese art—which evolved with almost no mutual interaction until the generation of Giuseppe Castiglione—while contrasting them, the quickest way would be to in this way create a \textit{tabula rasa} by washing them.\textsuperscript{39}

Now, let’s once again consider how Hegelianism is demonstrating a limited effectiveness in the construction of world art history. The negotiations between European art history and the non-European world from the nineteenth century onwards can be summarized as follows: \textit{Orientalisme}, \textit{Japonisme}, and \textit{Primitivisme}, to use the French spellings of the terms. \textit{Orientalisme} was the stage at which the Western European world depicted the Eastern world using its own painting grammar, \textit{Japonisme} the one at which Western Europe renewed its self-expression using the different aesthetic of an Other, and \textit{Primitivisme} the one at which the Western world, having materially conquered the world, searched for an unknown spirituality in the depths of Africa and the bosom of Asia. This is easily understood if one pictures the genealogy spanning from Delacroix to Van Gogh and then Pablo Picasso.

At the summit of the world history conceived as the phenomenology of this development of the Western world’s self-expression lays \textit{anachronisme}. Georges Bataille is a straightforward example. For Bataille, the oldest murals in human history that were discovered in the Lascaux caves possessed the most contemporary nature in that they were the newest case of something that renews the visual experience of humankind.\textsuperscript{40} That which is the oldest acquires the newest value. Origins point to the summit. Aby Warburg was a heretical scholar possessed by the madness of experiencing this reversal as that which survives from ancient times—or, put more precisely, has “life after death” (\textit{Nachleben})—in Renaissance Art. According to him primitive aesthetic experience is revived like a ghost in the renaissance via physical experience. The French art historian Georges Didi-Huberman defined this as conscious methodological anachronism.\textsuperscript{41}

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\textsuperscript{39} A useful related discussion can be found in Terry Smith, \textit{What is Contemporary Art?} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

\textsuperscript{40} Georges Bataille, \textit{Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art} (Genève: Skira, 1955).

\textsuperscript{41} Georges Didi-Huberman, \textit{L’image survivante, Histoire de l’art et temps des fantômes selon Aby Warburg} (Paris: Minuit, 2002). For a reading of this text, see Inaga Shigemi, “Imēji wa ikani umare, denpashi, taiken sareru no ka” イメージはいかに生まれ、伝播し、体験されるのか (How are Images Born, Propagated, and Experienced?), \textit{Tohō shinbun} 2789 (September 2006); and “Imēji kaishaku gaku no inpei ni seio 20
To put this logic in Buddhist terms, it is transmigration. Of course, a person cannot know whom they are the reincarnation of. If we follow the example of Mishima Yukio (1925–1970), who left us a tetralogy, *The Sea of Fertility*, the third volume of which is inspired by a Bangkok Theravada Buddhist temple, *Temple of Dawn*, we could say that descriptions of art history as the wanderings of a transmigrating soul also generally cannot be deemed a more fantastic attempt than Hegel's phenomenology of the spirit.

In fact, we could say that the art of the Aboriginal people of the Australian continent demonstrates the last spiritual discovery by the descendants of Hegelian phenomenology, in the sense that a primordial undertaking had its rights restored to it in reference to Western modern aesthetic set of values: at the cost of the redemption of the paintings of Aborigines on the Australian continent, which was appropriated by England's piracy, a historical self-awareness rooted in the West discovered a mindful domain of spirituality that was the polar opposite of territorial domination. The souls of native people's ancestors' have been reborn today through this recognition.

3. The Contemporary Practice of Piracy and Precedents in Commerce

3.1 The Politics of Fake Writing

As we have covered above, the five hundred years of the piracy of the Western world—from Southern Europe to England—forms the grounding for Hegelian conceptions of world history.
On this political topography, while on the one hand the principles of the Western world were seen as orthodox, the values in an inferior position that were eliminated from it were sullied as “piracy.” This unequal value consciousness now functions having sunk itself into the depths of the non-Western world’s self-consciousness. Today, the endeavor called world art and the commercial market that supports it is a mirage nesting in this dual structure.

Ever since the art history of the West and China was denatured and mixed into a pulp with a washing machine, the artists of China and other East Asian countries have sought to enter the Western orthodox art market from non-Western (“black”) markets. Therein what kind of traces of piracy survives? What kind of legalizing baptism did piracy undergo?

Xu Bing 徐冰 is famous for having exported fake Chinese characters that he himself had invented to the Western art market. They cover his artworks. In recent years he has come to assert that there is a system to these characters and that if one studies properly they are comprehensible. Here we find a careful strategy. First we cannot overlook the fact that he is two-tongued in a sense. On the one hand, he makes a show to his brethren in the Chinese character cultural sphere about how the characters he has created are just fake. At the same time, even if the European and American audience and critics (who are his primary target) know that his characters are fake, they cannot perceive this from literacy-based knowledge. They cannot understand via reading that they are looking at unreadable Chinese characters. We could say that Xu Bing’s “convinced crime” consists of his showing off counterfeit bills or a fake pirated text while stating that it is a pirated text. The secret to the creation of counterfeits succeeding in society lies in whether or not one adopts effective strategies not just towards those who cannot tell that something is counterfeit but also one’s partner who knows that it is counterfeit. Xu

46 Imafuku Ryūta 今福龍太 has worked to undermine the hegemony backed by this intellectual-material sense of territory using the metaphor of an archipelago in his Guntō-sekairon 群島 - 世界論 (An Archipelagic Worldview) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008) and (with Yoshimasu Gōzō 吉増剛造) Akiperago: Guntō to shite no sekai e アーキペラゴ:群島としての世界へ (Archipelago: Toward the World as an Archipelago) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006).
47 Regarding the predominance of Western values in art perception, see Inaga Shigemi, “Kindai no kokka korekushon to minkan korekushon no keisei: Tōyō / Nihon bijutsu no shūshū, tenjī, rōshutsu to sono gyakusetsu” 近代の国家コレクションと民間コレクションの形成: 東洋／日本美術の収集・展示・露出とその逆説 (The Formation of Modern State Collections and Private Collections: The Collection, Display, and Exposure of Eastern / Japanese Art and Their Paradox), Kigō kenyū (Studia Semiotica), Special Issue “Korekushon no kigōgaku” コレクションの記号学 (The Semiotics of Collections) 21 (2001): 75–101.
Inaga Shigemi

Bing has worked adequately to make those from the Chinese character cultural sphere who know that his characters are fake be satisfied with his work as well.

On the other hand, he then makes use of the principles behind the ideograms that are Chinese characters to increase the number of his fake characters (fig. 8). Chinese characters, which produce meaning by their combination of radicals, construct a complicated system via the dynamics which exist within them due to the compounding of basic terms. Xu Bing conceived new set of “Chinese characters” by the combination of alphabet. Thus, new fake letters were invented which are decodable and easy to learn, even by non-initiated Westerners. The dynamics within the system do not judge whether the products born as a result of this are legitimate or fake. This entirely depends on recognition as legitimate by external authority. The Chinese character cultural sphere had overwhelming power; what could be called fake character notation methods were fabricated in surrounding areas: kana in Japan and eomun 諺文 in Korea. Furthermore, in the Jurchen script and Khitan scripts there are rich traces of the surrounding cultural spheres’ inferiority complexes driving people to carefully construct over-complicated script systems. For an artist that tried to cross borders by constructing bridges between the Chinese character cultural sphere and cultural spheres outside of it, the invention of a fake script is certainly not a deviant act. Thus a piratical theory of fake character culture is needed.

3.2 Potato-Shaped Ceramic Pieces Running Rampant

Ni Haifeng 覚海峰 is another artist similarly known for having started from fake characters (fig. 9). He named a wall of neon lights made out of indecipherable picture characters “Trojan Horse,” an excellent metaphor for border crossing. An act of piracy in which the perpetrators disguise themselves and successfully break through the line of defense overlaps with Ni’s entry into Dutch society. Ni had his wife draw a zaffer blue and white pottery pattern on his naked body, and by this camouflage of a detachable, or perhaps we should say erasable, tattoo, transformed himself, both hiding his origins while showing them: cobalt pigment was a synonym for Chinese ceramics, as well as an indicator that pointed to his Chinese roots.

In the end he began to paint the same pattern on egg-sized ceramic chunks. Bringing to mind the expressions of delftware, this makes the viewer look back on the commerce between

49 Regarding Japan’s cultural perception and its reliance on the recognition apparati of the Western world, see Inaga Shigemi, “Roran Baruto aruwa kyōkō to shite no Nihon” ロラン・バルトあるいは虚構としての日本 (Roland Barthes, or Japan as a Fiction), in Hyōshō to shite no Nihon 表象としての日本 (Japan Represented), ed. Yamanouchi Hisaaki et al. (Tokyo: Hōsō Daigaku KYōiku Shinkōkai, 2004), 251–253.
51 Regarding Ni Haifeng, see Kitty Zijlmans, The Return of the Shreds: Ni Haifeng (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2008).
China and the Netherlands in the distant past. At the same time, these balls are also substitutes that imitate potatoes using ceramics. In Japanese, potatoes are referred to as *jagaimo* ジャガイモ, an abbreviation of *jagatara-imo* ジャガタライモ, or “Jakarta potato.” Potatoes produced in South America were carried all the way to the Netherlands through Java, and have now become a naturalized plant indispensable on Dutch dining tables. By tracing this route, the artist was presenting a narrative of his admission into Dutch society. The tactile nature of Ni’s ceramic chunks—they can be grasped in one’s hand—also served to counter Western art, which tends to biased towards the visual. Furthermore, the shape of them that brings to mind the water dropper, one of the items related to the so-called four treasures of the study in East Asian calligraphy, presents a subdued counter-argument against Western aesthetics from Immanuel Kant onwards, which holds that art cannot be for practical use. Furthermore, as a toy that can be rolled around on the palm of one’s hands they could be useful as a practical everyday health tool for the longevity of the elderly. When it comes to art, generally implacability and uniqueness leads to scarcity value, yet at the same time people want to acquire the things resembling treasures that are owned by their neighbors. Ni’s works resemble each other, yet no two of their potato shapes are the same, and they thus are ideal for satisfying this contradictory desire. If each citizen were to have one of Ni Haifeng’s works, he would acquire citizenship in Dutch society, so to speak. Yet at the same time his name would probably advance to the level of a trademark officially approved by citizens. In fact, in recent years Ni Haifeng did an excellent job at becoming a brand as seller of ceramic gardening furniture items upon which zaffer patterns were drawn.

### 3.3 Piracy and the Integrity of Lacquerware for Export

However, is this kind of piratical business method a phenomenon unique to contemporary times? This question brings to mind Chinese ceramicware (“china”) on the one hand and Japanese lacquerware made for export (“japan”) on the other. As has been shown by existing research on its distribution, in Jingdezhen 景徳鎮, China Japanese Imari 伊万里 porcelain fakes were made, and Jingdezhen ware imitations were exported from Arita 有田, Japan (where Imari was made). The Sir Percival David Collection donated to London University’s museum narrates for us that the truth of ceramic commerce lies in nothing other than mutual shrewd bewitching. Turning our gaze to the world of *makie* 蒔絵, Japanese lacquerware decorated with gold or silver powder, we know that *nanban makie* 南蛮蒔絵—*makie* for the Portuguese (fig. 10)—transformed into *kōmō makie* 紅毛蒔絵—*makie* for the Dutch—around the seventeenth century. While the Portuguese wanted Bible lecterns, receptacles to store holy images, as well

[54] Inaga Shigemi, “Toporoji kukan no naka no 21 seiki sekai bijutsu shi” (Part 3), *Aida* 147 (20 April 2008).
[56] See chapters two and three in Hidaka Kaori 日髙薰, *Ikoku no hyōshō: Kinsei yushutsu shikki no sōzōryoku* 外国の表象：近世輸出漆器の創造力 (Foreign Country Representations: The Creativity of Early Modern Exported Lacquerware) (Kunitachi: Buryukke, 2008). The *makie* box from the Victoria and Albert Museum appearing in
as chests with semicylindrical mother of pearl inlays, the Dutch that replaced them enjoyed *hira makie* 平蒔絵 in the form of flat-surfaced chests with imperial dynasty genre paintings. While *makie* products are supposedly unique to Japan and authentic, in reality they freely changed their form in response to customers’ demands and interests.

Let’s also consider a large gorgeous chest intended as a gift that appears to have passed through the hands of François Caron, who worked as the head of the Hirado Trading Post (fig. 11). On the Victoria and Albert Museum’s so-called Mazarin Chest, which is of an extraordinary size, one finds detailed *hira makie* designs that appear to be from picture scrolls regarding imperial dynasties. However, even experts today cannot decipher the stories used as its subject matter. The truth is probably that those who made it knew that what they were creating was for export and used nonsensical pictures. Here we find a legitimate pirate edition, or the invented legitimacy of a piratical business method sham. In short, they were made by the ancestors of Xu Bing and Ni Haifeng. Xu and Ni are the reincarnations of such artists. Or, to return to the beginning of this paper: these were the original makers of *battamon*.

We should probably touch upon the appropriation carried out by the legendary cabinetmaker Bernard II van Risenburgh (fig. 12). Using what is now an unclear secret method, he would peel off the lacquer surfaces from the base boards of exported *makie* and skillfully attach them to the curved surfaces of rococo furniture. With this skin graft surgery, he gave a new life to exported lacquerware that had gone out of style in the mansions and palaces of European nobility and royalty. They were granted life after death and underwent a magnificent rebirth. The exported lacquerware *makie* do not complain about the unfairness of their rebirth.

Despite this, why is the skin grafting onto migratory locusts shapes of leather upon which the brand names Gucci, Fendi, and Channel have been printed judged to be piracy? Can the truth of history not be glimpsed within the spread and metamorphosis of merchandise through trade routes? Here, we have been able to clearly grasp within a panoramic view of five hundred years of human world history the origins and structures of hegemonic dominance, which allow “the polite society” to censure and condemn this truth in history as piratical evil business.

In closing, let us add a system-accommodating conservative statement. In order to successfully carry out piracy, one should know the interplay of “*règle de jeu*” (rule of the game) and “*jeu de règle*” (margin of the rule). In other words, transgressions have their own strict rules to observe: there is a need to understand without error what will be an illegal act, or else the distribution of *battamon* will meet the tragic experience of being deemed and sentenced to illegal operation: such is the destiny of commerce.

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the photograph on this book’s cover is a typical example. Such pieces were displayed at the exhibition entitled “*japan makie*” (日本蒔絵) held at the Kyoto National Museum and the Suntory Art Museum (2008–2009). In the catalogue, see Nagashima Meiko 永島明子, “*japan makie*: Kyūtei o kazaru, tōyō no kirameki” 藻塗: 宮廷を飾る 東洋の燦めき (*Japan Makie: The Sparkle of the East Decorating Royal Courts*).

57 Inaga Shigemi, “In’yu to shite no urushi makie” 隠喩としての漆蒔絵 (*Lacquer Makie as a Metaphor*), *Bijutsu forum* 21 美術フォーラム 21 (Art Forum 21) 19 (2009): 115–119. The restoration of piracy and counterfeit routes of distribution are indispensable when recreating history.

58 A non-fiction style novel about Idemitsu Sazō, the founder of Idemitsu Kōsan who took a leading role in the importation of crude oil after Japan’s loss in World War II, has recently been receiving a lot of attention.
* This is a summary of a lecture given at Taiwan University on 7 October 2012. Its Japanese version has been printed in Taiwan by Xu Xingqing 徐興慶, ed. *Kindai Ajia no aporia* 近代東アジアのアポリア (Modern Asia’s Aporia) (Taipei: Taiwan Daxue Chuban Zhongxin, 2014), 123–152.

Hyakuta Naoki 百田尚樹, *Kaizoku to yobareta otoko* 海賊とよばれた男 (The Man Called a Pirate) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2012). We should probably take note of the following: the social conditions in which a successful businessperson would be called a “pirate” in a book’s title, that the real pirates in the historical context were no one other than the CIA, and the main character’s piracy broke through major market domination and in the end legally secured Japan’s rights. Ben Lopez’s *Negotiator: My Life at the Heart of the Hostage Trade* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2011) has been published in Japanese as *Negoshieitā: Hitojichi kyūshutsu e no shinri sen* ネゴシエイター：人質救出への心理戦, trans Tsuchiya Akira 土屋晃 and Kondō Takafumi 近藤隆文 (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 2012).
Fig. 1 Mitsuhiro Okamoto, *Batta-mon*, 2011

Fig. 2 Treaties of Tordesillas, June 7, 1494
source: 山川出版社『詳説世界史』

Fig. 3 Felipe II (1527–1598) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598)

Fig. 4 François I (1494–1547) and Süleyman I (1494–1566)

Fig. 5 Major Circum-Global Trade Routes, 1400–1800
Source: Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient*, 1998; 由下範久訳、藤原書店、2000

Fig. 6 El Anatsui, Solo-Exhibition,
The National Museum of Ethnology,
Suita, Japan, 2011
A Pirate’s View of the History of Art Commerce


Fig. 8 Xu Bing, *Art for the People*, 2011 © Xu Bing

Fig. 9 Ni Haifeng, *Delfware Potato* © Ni Haifeng

Fig. 10 *Namban Coffer* covered in Pearl Shell Plaques, ca. 1600–1640, Private Collection, Lisbon

Fig. 11 “Mazarin Chest”, Victoria and Albert Museum, London

Fig. 12 *Commode with Pavilions in Landscape*, attributed to Bernard II van Riesenburgh, Victoria and Albert Museum, London